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Abstract: In order to exploit the Arctic Circle, one must carefully take into 
account the importance of the Arctic region, its unique characteristics and 
the nature of international relations in the area. The region is becoming 
increasingly important in national defence and trade strategies because it 
is melting. The region’s unique characteristics are determined by climate 
and the challenges posed by deep, offshore drilling. Conflicts and the 
instances of cooperation between Arctic neighbours have a considerable 
effect on the future exploitation of the Arctic. Overlapping claims are not 
helpful in attracting the huge investments needed for arctic drilling and 
cross-border offshore deposits cannot be sustainably exploited without the 
prior consent of the parties. This paper focuses on both the history of the 
extractive industry’s efforts to overcome the challenges of the Arctic Circle 
and on the timeline of cooperation in the development of offshore cross-
border deposits. 
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Introduction 
 
The history of the oil industry has been defined by moments when 
experts felt either baffled or challenged to come up with ingenious technical 
solutions while being able to also protect the environment.     
It was considered that drilling under lakes posed too great a threat to 
both the environment and crews for the industry to undertake. Then, it was 
thought that drilling in extreme weather conditions (desert, ice) or in places 
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where geologists knew little about the subsoil was impossible. And still, the 
industry found ways and means to do the impossible and turn these phases 
into stepping stones, now considered revolutionary from a technological 
point of view. Nowadays, the new ―impossible‖ is the Arctic Circle. There 
are voices saying that drilling in the Arctic should be forbidden and voices 
arguing that technology can offer safe exploitation methods.  
What is sure is that the Arctic Circle is melting and, sooner or later, 
drilling will be possible on increasingly larger areas. The situation is 
complicated by political disputes between arctic states and their overlapping 
claims over lands, waters and natural resources. Thus, it is all the more 
important to find an exploitation method that is both technologically safe 
and politically resourceful.  
Cross-border cooperation for the development of oil and gas 
deposits has proven efficient in both the Persian Gulf and in the Circle‘s 
neighbourhood (the North Sea). 
In order to understand why cross-border cooperation can be the best 
suited method to exploit the Arctic Circle, it is necessary to analyze the 
area‘s characteristics and the regional dynamic. Thus, the following sections 
will analyze physical characteristics of the Arctic Circle, the history of 
drilling in the region, the history of relations between the arctic states, the 
cooperation and the joint development agreements in the extended Arctic 
Circle and, finally, the possible threats and opportunities to arctic 
cooperation.   
  
Physical characteristics of the Arctic Circle 
 
Because of global warming, the status of the Arctic has been in 
constant change from two perspectives: the hydrocarbons potential and the 
opening of new navigation routes, both important for military purposes 
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(Russia
1
) and commercial ones (China
2
).  
In 2007, the summer with the lowest ice coverage ever recorded
3
, a 
Russian submarine planted a Russian flag on the North Pole seabed
4
. 
Speculations over a drive for resources started and it became apparent that 
regional jurisdiction has political weight.  
Arctic sea ice reaches its maximum each March, at the end of 
winter. On February 25, 2015 Arctic sea ice reached its maximum extent for 
the year, at 14.54 million km
2. This year‘s maximum ice extent was the 
lowest in the satellite record, with below-average ice conditions everywhere 
except in the Labrador Sea and Davis Strait. The maximum extent is 1.10 
million km
2
, below the 1981 to 2010 average of 15.64 million km
2
 and 
130,000 km
2
 below the previous lowest maximum that occurred in 2011. 
Arctic sea ice reaches its minimum each September, at the end of 
summer. September Arctic sea ice is now declining at a rate of 13.3% per 
decade, relative to the 1981 to 2010 average
5
. In 2014 Arctic sea ice 
reached the minimum sixth lowest level on record
6
. According to some 
estimates, by mid-century, summers will be ice free
7
. 
                                               
1 Kukil Bora, ―Russia Is Building A Network of Military Bases In The Arctic,‖ Business 
Insider, November 25, 2014, accessed at http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-arctic-
expansion-2014-11. 
2 Bill Savadore, ―Global Warming Opens A New Shipping Route For China That ‗Could 
Change World Trade,‘‖ Business Insider, August 17, 2013, accessed at 
http://www.businessinsider.com.au/china-begins-using-arctic-shipping-route-that-could-
change-the-face-of-world-trade-2013-8.  
3 ―Arctic Sea Ice,‖ Earth Observatory, NASA, n.d., 
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/SeaIce/page3.php.    
4 Tom Parfitt, ―Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed,‖ The Guardian, August 2, 2007, 
accessed at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic.     
5 ―Arctic Ice Sea Minimim,‖ National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2014, 
accessed at http://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/arctic-sea-ice/.   
6 ―2014 Arctic Sea Ice Minimum Sixth Lowest on Record,‖ National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, 2014, accessed at http://www.nasa.gov/press/2014/september/2014-
arctic-sea-ice-minimum-sixth-lowest-on-record/#.VWohAtKqqkp. 
7 ―Vary January,‖ National Snow and Ice Data Center, Arctic Sea Ice News and Analysis, 
February 3, 2015, accessed at http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2015/02/vary-january/. 
Adina Anghelache  RJHIS 3 (1) 2016 
 
 
10 
 
Thus, ice retreat takes place in an accelerated rhythm compared to 
both last years‘ levels and last decades‘ average. This process is seen by 
some politicians as an environmental disaster and by others as an 
opportunity.  
It is estimated that 13% of the world´s undiscovered oil and 30% of 
undiscovered natural gas resources are in the Arctic Ocean, mostly in water 
not exceeding 500 meters in depth. Also, it is estimated that Russia owns 
half of these gas deposits whereas the US owns half of the oil resources
8
. 
 
Drilling history 
 
Recent media attention to Arctic exploitation creates the false 
impression of a new trend in the development of these resources. However, 
the region has been successfully exploited for over four decades.  
In 1968 ARCO and Standard Oil found oil in the largest North 
American deposit, the Prudhoe Bay, which became economically viable in 
1977 after completion of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. Meanwhile, 
companies (Shell in the 1980s and BP in 2012 in the Liberty field) found 
more deposits but did not start production due to high costs. In the 
Canadian sector, natural oil seeps have been leaking since the 18
th 
century.  
Onshore drillings started in the 1920s and offshore drillings in 1972. 
Because of low oil prices, the production rate slowed down in the 1980s but 
picked up again in early 2000s. The largest Canadian offshore deposit 
(Hibernia) has been in exploitation since 1997. Greenland has had a more 
complicated history with hydrocarbon exploration and development, in part 
because the majority of its territory lies north of the Arctic Circle and is 
characterized by extreme ice conditions. In the 1970s, in offshore West 
Greenland, the first substantial seismic surveys were conducted and 
                                               
8 ―Arctic Oil and Gas‖, 2013, accessed at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Arctic_oil_and_gas/$FILE/Arctic_oil_and_ga
s.pdf.   
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exploratory wells were drilled but with little success. Even after the most 
recent exploration efforts by Cairn Energy in the ocean floor off Western 
Greenland in 2011, no discoveries of great commercial significance have 
yet been made. Despite all this, the industry remains optimistic as proven 
by Tullow Oil‘s purchase of a 40% stake in an exploration block in Baffin 
Bay in October 2012. Norway began exploration activity in the 1970s and 
Russia in the 1980s. Neither country is a stranger to offshore development 
in extreme northern climates.  
In 1984, Statoil discovered the Snøhvit development, the world‘s 
northernmost offshore gas field. Norway has since constructed the world‘s 
northernmost liquefied natural gas facility and has a good reputation for 
compliance with strict environmental standards. Russia discovered the first 
offshore Arctic gas field in the Barents Sea in 1983, and the first underwater 
oil deposits in the Severo-Gulyaevskoe field in 1986. Since then Russia 
continued pursuing exploration activities in its western Arctic waters in the 
Kara, Barents, and Pechora Seas. For Russia, represented by the state-run 
oil giant Rosneft, the Arctic oil and gas are a long term strategic priority 
that could be a significant source of production growth beyond 2020.  
Rosneft and Gazprom enjoy exclusive rights to the Arctic shelf and 
already hold a combined 80% of the shelf currently in exploration and 
production. The government is looking to introduce tax incentives to make 
shelf exploration and production more economically viable.   
Arctic oil is attractive for Norway also, due to its ageing fields in the 
North Sea and Norwegian Sea. Largely due to a predictable and stable 
regulatory environment for its offshore hydrocarbon developments, Norway 
has attracted more than $9 billion in investments over the past few years. It 
is important to note that, although a good deal of Norway‘s future 
hydrocarbon potential lies in areas north of the Arctic Circle, the conditions 
do not meet true Arctic criteria, particularly in terms of the ice regime
9
.  
                                               
9 ―Opportunities and Challenges for Arctic Oil and Gas Development‖, Washington DC, 
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Cooperation agreements in the extended Arctic  
  
In the Arctic Circle there are precedents not only in drilling 
operations but also in cross-border cooperation. The history of common 
development follows the pattern seen in other regions. States begin by 
signing agreements stating that if resources are discovered, other 
agreements will be negotiated in order to establish the exploitation method. 
The next step is to recognize the deposit‘s unity. Later on, states will 
transform signing agreements that state the exploitation method and the 
profit sharing scheme into state practice. Cooperation can take the form of 
border settlement or of implementing the unitization concept. All this 
represent a solid starting point for future common development projects.   
Initially, agreements between Arctic states did not consider common 
deposits. The agreements between Norway and Denmark (1965 and 1979) 
only stated the necessity of another treaty on the discussed resources and 
the agreement between Canada and Denmark (1973) is even weaker than 
that, only asking that ―the parties shall seek to reach an agreement‖10.  
Also, the US-USSR treaty of 1972 states that the two parties, in 
accordance with international law, will exercise sovereignty over their 
respective territories. However, none of the three treaties was followed by 
agreements detailing the problems discussed
11
.  
The Netherlands and Denmark presented to the International Court 
of Justice their claims over the North Sea Continental Shelf. These claims 
                                                                                                                       
2014, accessed at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Artic Report_F2.pdf.   
10 ―Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government 
of Canada Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Greenland and 
Canada‖, United Nations, 1973, art. 5, accessed at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/DN
K-CAN1973CS.PDF.  
11 James Lloyd Loftis, Timothy J. Tyler, Emilie E. Hawker, ―Gaps in the Ice: Maritime 
Boundaries and Hydrocarbon Field Development in the Arctic‖, in Oil, Gas & Energy Law 
Intelligence Vol. 10, No. 2, 2012, accessed at 
http://www.velaw.com/uploadedfiles/vesite/resources/maritimeboundariesarctic.pdf.   
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overlapped with Germany‘s so the Court decided the two cases in a single 
Judgment
12
. 
The Parties asked the Court to state the principles and rules of 
international law applicable, on the basis of which they would define the 
boundaries. The Court rejected the position of Denmark and the 
Netherlands that the principle of equidistance should be the basis of 
boundary delimitation, stating instead that the boundary lines in question 
were to be drawn by agreement between the Parties and in accordance with 
equitable principles.  
Also, it indicated certain factors to be taken into consideration 
during negotiations, such as the general configuration of the coasts of the 
Parties, the presence of any special or unusual features, the physical and 
geological structure and natural resources of the continental shelf in the 
areas involved, the proportionality between the extent of the continental 
shelf areas appertaining to each State and the length of its coast
13
.  
Recognition of the need to unitize comes with the Canada–Denmark 
Treaty of 1973 regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf. If a 
common deposit was to be found, the two parties were to reach another 
agreement as to its exploitation. Bilateral cooperation went a step further: 
the states agreed not to issue resource-exploration licenses in areas 
bordering the dividing line without the other state‘s consent14. 
The North Sea continental shelf has several examples of cross-
border unitization agreements. The first example is the 1976 unitization 
treaty between the United Kingdom and Norway for the Frigg gas field. 
                                               
12 ―North Sea Continental Shelf Cases - Judgment of 20 February 1969‖, International 
Court of Justice, 1969, accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=295&code=cs2&p1=3&p2=3&case=52&k=cc&p3=5.     
13 Ibidem. 
14 T. Praprotnik, ―Arctic Offshore Energy Resources: Distribution Across International 
Boundaries and Climatic Impact‖, Duke University, 2013, p. 16, accessed at 
http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/6855/Praprotnik Master%27s 
Project.pdf?sequence=1.                
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Subsequent agreements for the Murchison and Statfjord fields, signed in 
1979, were largely based on the Frigg Agreement. Also, the United 
Kingdom signed an agreement with the Netherlands in 1992. The 
agreement is similar with those signed with Norway and it regards the 
unitization of the Markham field
15
. 
The 1976 Frigg unitization agreement was based on the boundary 
established in 1965. The parties would decide how to share profits and 
retain a significant degree of autonomy in regulating their area. The deposit 
was to be exploited by a single operator over which none of the parties was 
to have exclusive jurisdiction
16
. 
Norwegian state practice in the North Sea was further developed 
through the Statfjord exploitation agreement. In order to exploit it, the two 
parties entered boundary negotiations, but it took 14 years to agree on a 
unitization agreement. The Statfjord agreement mostly copied the Frigg 
agreement. The peak of this state practice came in 2005, when Norway and 
the United Kingdom signed a framework for the establishment of a 
mechanism for cross-boundary petroleum co-operation
17
. 
The agreement stated that deposits were to be exploited as single 
units
18
 and that the parties had considerable control over the operators 
exploiting these deposits. Norwegian state practice evolved from a time 
consuming process of unitizing each deposit to a very simplified 
mechanism.  
                                               
15 Thomas Wälde, Ana E. Bastida, Adaeze Ifesi-Okoye, et al, ―Cross-Border Unitization 
and Joint Development Agreements: An International Law Perspective,‖ in Houston 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2007, pp. 378-379, accessed at 
http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/handle/2160/754.  
16 J.L. Loftis et al., op. cit., p. 14-15. 
17 ―Framework Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway Concerning 
Cross-Boundary Petroleum Co-Operation‖, United Kingdom Government, 2005, chapter 1, 
art. 1.1, accessed at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/273282/679
2.pdf.    
18 Ibidem, cap. 3, art. 3.1. 
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The change from simply recognizing the importance of unitization 
to adopting joint development as a state practice is also seen in the 1981 
agreement between Iceland and Norway. It was based on a UN Conciliation 
Commission report
19
. The Commission was established to advice Iceland 
and Norway on continental shelf boundaries and, in 1980, it proposed a 
single line for both the continental shelf and the EEZ. Regarding the 
overlapping area claimed by both states, the Commission recommended the 
adoption of a joint development agreement covering the entire area thought 
to be rich in hydrocarbons. It also recommended the unitization of deposits 
found lying across the line
20
.  
The Commission‘s approach was adopted in the subsequent 1981 
Agreement on the Continental Shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen. The 
signatories agreed to the extension of the Icelandic EEZ and to sharing of 
certain hydrocarbon resources. Also, they recognized that the continental-
shelf and the EEZs would coincide. They further established a 45,020 km
2
 
joint-development zone that overlapped the two states‘ EEZs—the 
Norwegian EEZ in the north and the Icelandic EEZ in the south.  
Exploitation parameters were set for both sectors of the joint area as 
well as the percentage of each state‘s participation. Finally, the agreement 
provided for the shared exploitation of deposits even partially located 
within the joint-development zone. The first production licenses in the JDZ 
were granted in 2013. They were also the first-ever production licenses in 
Icelandic waters
21
.  
Relevant when discussing this agreement is the importance of the 
unitization principle. This principle is the agreement‘s centrepiece, even 
                                               
19 Decision of June 1981 Conciliation Commission on the Continental Shelf area between 
Iceland and Jan Mayen: Report and recommendations to the governments of Iceland and 
Norway, in Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XXVII, 1981.    
20 David M. Ong, ―Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: ‗Mere‘ 
State Practice or Customary International Law?‖, in The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 93, no. 4, 1999, p. 786, accessed at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555344. 
21 T. Praprotnik, op. cit., p. 17.    
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though conditions vary for the exploitation of every deposit in each 
subsector, located on either side of the JDZ. It applies to both present 
situations and future ones. Both the existing deposits (at the moment of the 
signing) and those subsequently discovered were to be exploited in 
common, so that each state‘s interests are respected and the process is 
efficient. 
 
The Denmark-Norway boundary dispute and resolution  
 
In 1988, Denmark submitted an application to the International 
Court of Justice to decide the maritime boundary between Greenland 
(Denmark) and Jan Mayen (Norway). Norway argued that the maritime 
boundary between the two islands should follow the median lines, as 
previous maritime delimitation agreements involving states‘ coastlines.  
In June 1993, the ICJ held that the previous agreements did not 
determine the boundary in question and that it would, thus, have to be 
determined independently. The ICJ shifted the provisional median-line 
boundary eastward to allocate a larger portion of the shelf area to Denmark, 
citing the disparity in the lengths of Greenland‘s coastline and Jan Mayen‘s 
coastline and the access to fishery resources in the area. Also, the ICJ noted 
that access to the area‘s mineral resources could also be relevant to the 
delimitation.   
Based on the ICJ‘s 1993 judgment, in 1995, Denmark and Norway 
concluded an agreement on the boundary between Greenland and Jan 
Mayen and created a cooperation mechanism regarding cross-border 
deposits. If a deposit extended across both states‘ continental shelves and it 
could be exploited wholly or in part from the other side, then the parties 
will sign another agreement. The same would be applicable if the 
exploitation of the resources in the area by one Party would affect the 
possibility of exploitation by the other Party. The states also agreed that 
Iceland was to be included in the final agreements and delimitations, as 
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Iceland would be affected.  
In 1997, Iceland and Demark concluded an analogous agreement 
with respect to their continental-shelf boundary, just south of the 1995 
Denmark-Norway boundary. In accordance with the 1995 Denmark-
Norway agreement, the Denmark-Iceland treaty noted that the northernmost 
boundary point was to be established in cooperation with a third party, 
Norway. The agreement also included a natural resource provision nearly 
identical to the provision in the Denmark-Norway 1995 treaty
22
. 
Similar to the 1997 Iceland-Denmark agreement is the 2006 
agreement between Greenland (Denmark) and Svalbard (Norway), which 
outlines the maritime boundary. It went a step further than the maritime 
resources clause of the 1997 Iceland–Denmark agreement because it stated 
that a future exploitation agreement will establish the exploitation method 
and the profits sharing scheme.    
  
The 2010 Norway-Russia Treaty Concerning Maritime Delimitation 
and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean 
 
After more than 40 years of negotiations the agreement set out the 
maritime boundary in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. Analogous to 
the 1990 U.S.-Soviet Agreement, the treaty specified that Russia could 
exercise EEZ jurisdiction over an area within Norway‘s EEZ23.  
Approximately 176 000 km
2
 were now opened for exploitation
24
.  
The 1990 U.S.-Soviet Agreement recognized the line established by 
the 1867 Convention Ceding Alaska as the maritime boundary between the 
states‘ EEZs as well as any potential continental shelf beyond them and 
created the so called ―special zones‖. The ―eastern special zone‖ was on the 
American side of the 1867 line, at less than 200 miles from the Soviet 
                                               
22 Ibidem, pp. 20-21.   
23 Ibidem, p. 29. 
24 Opportunities and Challenges for Arctic Oil and Gas Development, op. cit..  
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coastline but at more than 200 miles from the American coast. Conversely, 
the ―special western zone‖ was on the Soviet side of the line, at less than 
200 miles from the American coastline and at more than 200 miles from the 
Soviet coastline. 
The parties agreed that in the ―special eastern zone‖, the US would 
have sovereign and jurisdictional rights that the USSR would have had 
without the agreement. The same went for the ―western special zone‖. The 
agreement did not extend EEZs to the ―special zones‖. It only gave 
economic rights over what would become disputed areas if both the 1867 
line and the 200 mile EEZ principle had been applied. The United States 
ratified this Agreement and the Russian Federation applies it provisionally 
from the date of signature up to the present. 
The 2010 ―Norway-Russia Treaty Concerning Maritime 
Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea‖ demonstrates the parties‘ 
efforts for efficient resources exploitation. The treaty creates the framework 
for the joint development of cross-border deposits and it attaches details 
about the conditions to be met by the unitization agreements, one for each 
deposit. The treaty offers both a safe judicial framework and the much-
needed flexibility in negotiating each subsequent agreement. Also, it 
recognizes that private companies could play a significant role in making 
the unitization process more efficient.  
In November 2012 Canada and Denmark signed an agreement on 
EEZs in the Lincoln Sea which could turn into the first step towards the 
settlement of other standing disputed delimitations
25
.  
In 2014 Russia announced that it would increase its military 
presence in the Arctic. As a result, Canada decided to settle the dispute with 
Denmark so it could focus on other regions in the Arctic where it suspects 
                                               
25 ―Canada and Kingdom of Denmark Reach Tentative Agreement on Lincoln Sea 
Boundary,‖ Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, 2012, accessed at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2012/11/28a.aspx?lang=eng. 
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Russia may infringe on territories claimed by Canada
26
.  
 
Threats  
 
As we‘ve seen, in the Arctic Circle there is precedent in terms of 
successful drillings for oil and gas. More than that, there is historical 
precedent in terms of agreements regarding unitization, cooperation and 
joint development. Thus, the region presents the needed preconditions for 
cross-border cooperation. Nonetheless, the region also presents threats to 
future cross-border cooperation.   
Firstly, the climate remains the main enemy of the extractive 
industry in the Arctic. There are extreme temperatures for most of the year, 
long periods of darkness, the ice has a destructive effect on installations and 
the subsoil cannot be drilled in for some periods due to its physical 
characteristics.  
Secondly, a mature oil industry requires not only drilling technology 
but also adequate infrastructure. From this point of view, the oil industry is 
severely limited by the high costs of drilling platforms and transport 
capabilities (pipelines, ice breakers, special ships) and by the considerable 
length of supply lines
27
. 
Thirdly, exploitation can be hampered by the long period between 
exploration and commercial production, as proven by previous exploitations 
(20 years in the case of Hibernia and Sakhalin fields)
28
.  
Also, despite the advanced drilling technology, the threat to the 
environment is still worrisome. After the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil 
                                               
26 Svein Magnason, ―Hans Island Dispute Eases,‖ NORA Region Trends, August 27, 2014, 
accessed at http://www.noraregiontrends.org/politics/politicalnews/article/hans-island-
dispute-eases/87/neste/4/. 
27 Arctic Oil and Gas, op. cit.. 
28 Opportunities and Challenges for Arctic Oil and Gas Development, op. cit.. 
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Spill
29
, there are serious concerns that a technical fault would lead to 
serious environmental damages given how difficult it would be to clean the 
area. Those arguing that the industry cannot operate in the region were 
encouraged by Shell‘s several conspicuous mishaps in 2012, when the 
anchors of two drill ships slipped (the Noble Discoverer drillship nearly ran 
aground and the Kulluk drillship actually ran aground)
30
.  
In other areas of the Arctic governments are trying to calm worries 
related to the environment while attempting to satisfy economic demands. 
Canada held an auction for more than 900,000 hectares in the Beaufort Sea 
and Mackenzie Delta only after the release of a National Energy Board 
review of offshore Arctic drilling. Also, the government called for bids to 
develop a five-year strategic plan to conduct oil spill research in the 
Canadian Arctic
31
. 
Those opposing drilling in the Arctic argue on behalf of upholding 
the Memorandum over the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and toughening 
the legislation concerning the extended Arctic Circle.  
Drilling in the Arctic faces not only the dangers related to the nature 
of the region but also political and bureaucratic ones. On one hand, despite 
various forms of cross-border cooperation enshrined in the agreements 
between Arctic states, territorial disputes continue to threaten the industry. 
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established ways of 
demarcating different types of maritime sectors, as well as the mechanism 
for settling overlapping claims.  
According to UNCLOS, coastal states have the right to an exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) of up to 200 nautical miles from their coast. Beyond 
this line, states can claim rights over seabed resources if they can prove that 
the seabed is a natural prolongation of their national territory. By allowing 
                                               
29 Cutler J. Cleveland, ―Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,‖ in The Encyclopedia of Earth, 
December 5, 2010, accessed at http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/161185/. 
30 Opportunities and Challenges for Arctic Oil and Gas Development, op. cit.. 
31 Ibidem. 
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governments the possibility of claiming rights beyond the 200 nautical 
miles line, UNCLOS created the perfect conditions for overlapping claims.  
For example, Russia claims that its territory extends all the way to 
the North Pole, along the Lomonosov Ridge, an idea rejected by Canada
32
, 
Denmark
33
 and the US. Russia, Canada and Denmark argue that the ridge is 
a natural prolongation of their own territory, whereas the US argues that the 
Lomonosov Ridge is an oceanic ridge which would mean that no country 
can extend its rights over it
34
. Back in 2002, Russia submitted its petition to 
the United Nations but the bid was rejected on lack of evidence. On 3 
August 2015 Russia re-submitted its petition to the United Nations claiming 
exclusive control over 1.2 million km
2
 of the Arctic sea shelf, backing their 
claim, this time, with what its foreign ministry calls "ample scientific 
data"
35
. 
Also, Canada has a standing dispute over the Beaufort Sea with the 
US. The two countries have competing views on how to draw the border. 
Thus, the 26 100 km
2
 between Alaska and Yukon are in a judicial limbo, 
together with their natural resources. The area is believed to be rich in 
resources, which could entice the parties to speed up negotiations
36
. 
Unresolved Arctic sovereignty claims could substantially delay 
development of those oil and natural gas resources where economic 
                                               
32 Arctic Oil and Gas, op.cit..  
33 Bob Weber, ―Denmark Claims North Pole through Arctic Underwater Ridge Link from 
Greenland,‖ in Global News, December 16, 2015, accessed at 
http://globalnews.ca/news/1729295/denmark-claims-north-pole-through-arctic-underwater-
ridge-link-from-greenland/. 
34 ―Evolution Of Arctic Territorial Claims And Agreements: A Timeline (1903-Present)‖, 
The Stimson Center, September 15, 2013, accessed at 
http://www.stimson.org/infographics/evolution-of-arctic-territorial-claims-and-agreements-
a-timeline-1903-present/.   
35 K. Jayalakshmi, ―Russia submits claim over Arctic and North Pole to UN citing 
scientific proof‖,  International Business Times, August 8, 2015, accessed at 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/russia-submits-claim-over-arctic-north-pole-un-citing-scientific-
proof-1514616.    
36 T. Praprotnik, op. cit., p. 31. 
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sovereignty claims overlap
37
. 
Also, as opposed to Norway‘s decision to turn unitization 
agreements into state practice, Canada, Denmark and the US have no record 
in this regard. On the other hand, red tape and unattractive fiscal policies 
decrease the chances of developing a profitable oil industry.  
At the moment, in Arctic Alaska, the lease term is 10 years. Given 
the weather conditions and the lengthy permitting processes (that involve 
multiple federal and state-level government agencies), the time is hardly 
sufficient. Also, companies can lease blocks of up to only 3 square miles. 
The regulations can create situations when dropping 
exploration/exploitation plans is more profitable than continuing efforts to 
reach commercial production
38
. 
Perhaps the biggest hindrance to the exploitation of the Arctic Circle 
is the unpredictability of prices for a barrel of oil. On the one hand, a 
cheaper barrel, as it is now, means that the investments needed for Arctic 
drilling are not profitable. On the other hand, setting the Arctic business 
strategy is hampered by the long period between exploration and 
commercial production.  
Because nobody knows how the oil industry and the global market 
will look like in 20 years, one might think that the oil companies cannot 
take the risk of being excluded from an area with great potential. It would 
not be the first time in history when, despite cheap oil and overproduction, 
multinational oil companies decide to make significant investments in 
regions where they would not have invested if they took into consideration 
the global oil prices. In this regard, we note Shell‘s39 plans to continue 
                                               
37 Philip Budzik, ―Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Potential,‖ U.S. Energy Information 
Administration Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting Oil and Gas Division, 2009, 
accessed at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/arctic/. 
38 Opportunities and Challenges for Arctic Oil and Gas Development, op.cit.. 
39 Karl Mathiesen, ―Shell gets final clearance to begin drilling for oil in the Arctic―, The 
Guardian, August 18, 2015, accessed at 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/18/shell-gets-final-clearance-to-begin-
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drilling in the Chukchi Sea even after the 2012 incident and in the context 
of the oil price dropping to about $50/barrel. 
 
Opportunities  
 
When analyzing the Arctic Circle, one can see the threats to cross-
border cooperation and the precedent set by agreements that either settled 
disputes or created the necessary conditions for future cooperation. 
Setting aside the steps that states take to cooperate in the 
development of their cross-border deposits, individual initiatives to boost 
the industry are worth discussing. 
Giver the very long time between exploration and commercial 
production, some countries look for new ways of attracting investments. 
One of these methods is changing the leasing terms, by increasing the 
number of years and decreasing royalties and taxes.  
 As opposed to the US, Canada encourages greater risk-taking by 
energy companies willing to commit capital and resources to the Arctic. 
Operators can acquire large territory with ―work commitment bids‖ for 9 
years. If discoveries are made, the Significant Discovery License (SDL) 
system allows operators to retain control over their field until it becomes 
economically viable to develop and produce the resource.  
Canada is not the only country trying to cut unnecessary red tape in 
order to attract investments. Greenland permits operators to acquire much 
larger tracts of offshore blocks than the three square mile blocks offered by 
the United States. Furthermore, in the Northeast Greenland offshore, 
operators can extend the initial license term to 16 years. This area holds 
extremely promising resource development potential, but it also poses some 
of the most—if not the most—challenging ice conditions across the entire 
                                                                                                                       
drilling-for-oil-in-the-arctic.  
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Arctic
40
. 
Another individual initiative (if realized, it could consolidate Arctic 
resources exploitation) is the possible future change in the status of the 
National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska and its eventual opening towards 
commercial bids. The Reserve was established in the 1920s so that the 
American Navy, if needed, could tap into the oil of an area owned by the 
federal government. Multiple sectors have been leased
41
 and in the 
conversation about the future, multiple strong voices were heard: activists, 
oil companies, the federal government, local communities (some against
42
 
and some in favour of
43
 drilling) and the authorities charged with the 
Reserve‘s management. These authorities are, in turn, under the influence of 
numerous political parties.  
   
Conclusions 
 
The obvious and accelerated warming of the Arctic Circle 
reactivates a number of challenges and problems. On the one hand, the 
retreat of glaciers brings forward an opening of maritime routes with great 
commercial and/or military potential. On the other hand, the absence of 
glaciers means that the area can be exploited. At the same time, the 
exploitation of the melted Arctic Circle is hampered by climate, costs and 
conflicts between the riparian states. 
                                               
40 Ibidem. 
41 ―National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska‖, U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of 
Land Management, accessed at  
http://www.blm.gov/ak/st/en/prog/energy/oil_gas/npra.html. 
42 Scott Patterson, ―Native American Tribe Opposing Alaska Drilling by Big Oil,‖ Mother 
Earth News, 1996, accessed at http://www.motherearthnews.com/nature-and-
environment/tribe-opposing-alaska-drilling-zmaz96onzgoe.aspx.    
43 Terry Macalister, ―Arctic Resource Wealth Poses Dilemma for Indigenous 
Communities,‖ The Guardian, July 4, 2011, accessed at 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/jul/04/arctic-resources-indigenous-
communities. 
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The industry has proven that it can overcome environmental 
challenges and that it can develop safe drilling and transportation methods. 
Also, interstate cooperation in the development of offshore, cross-border 
deposits has proven both efficient and sustainable from legal, political and 
commercial points of view. It remains to be seen if the Arctic states will be 
overwhelmed by the threats posed to the Arctic exploitation or whether they 
will take advantage of the opportunities for cooperation and the 
development of the industry in this difficult but rich region. 
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